

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE: 27-9-76
TO: DD/S+T		
ROOM NO. 6F42	BUILDING Hqs	
REMARKS:		
<p>Les, [redacted] went to Pentagon to read the draft Army Marshall report. It isn't as bad as I really expected considering so many hostile panel members and the pressures around the Pentagon. We are promised a copy of final report.</p>		
FROM: [redacted]		
ROOM NO. [redacted]		

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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Executive Registry

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080008-9

77-6259

22 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of the Draft Results of DOD Panel Review  
of CIA [ ] Backfire

ANALYSIS

1. In the Introduction, the draft panel report states that there is insufficient basis to alter the previously agreed views of Backfire's capability while emphasizing the considerable uncertainty as to the aircraft's performance.

2. In the Summary and Conclusions I interpret the report to say:

a. It is currently impossible to determine an authentic single answer as to Backfire's maximum range capability. It is possible to establish reasonable bounds (ie: 3500 to 5500 nm with a 10,000 pound payload) but these bounds are very broad.

b. The CIA analysis does not narrow the uncertainty about performance although its conclusions could represent the weight of Backfire A or Backfire B

[ ]  
The weight is consistent with the lower bounds of the uncertainty band but would represent a dismal state-of-the-art indicative of 20 year old U.S. technology.

c. The critical aspect of the analysis is the assumption that [ ]

[ ] If the assumption is true, then the analysis is probably a true representation of the Backfire A flight test prototype's characteristics (sic). If not true, serious errors result. The panel

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SUBJECT: Review of the Draft Results of DOD Panel Review  
of CIA/[ ] Backfire

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strongly recommends considerable additional analysis before the conclusions are accepted as even indicative of Backfire A.

d. The panel strongly urges that [ ]

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[ ] This is mandatory before the credibility of the analysis can be judged. Until this is done there is insufficient data to justify creating a new DOD position.

3. Thus far the final draft has been reviewed by only one member of the panel and final coordination may take some unspecified time. CIA will probably receive a copy of the final report. This final draft differs somewhat from a preliminary report (3 September 1976) which described [ ] analysis technique as "valuable and evidently valid based on the data they looked at and were provided."

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